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Homeownership is the American dream. Not only does it promote
personal autonomy and achievement, it is beneficial to neighborhoods in
that it increases residents' involvement in their own community.' One of
the primary methods of accumulating wealth today is home ownership.2
Ownership enables one to borrow against their home to finance the
necessities and luxuries of life, education, retirement, and vacations.3
Unfortunately, for most, home ownership is unfeasible without access to
credit.4 Minorities often face discrimination in attempting to obtain
credit to finance a mortgage, resulting in an inability to become a
homeowner and pursue the American dream.
This comment will highlight the Community Reinvestment Act
("CRA"), a congressional vehicle for encouraging lending institutions to
adopt non-discriminatory practices. CRA standards and enforcement
mechanisms will be examined, focusing on the impact of financial
modernization and technology on CRA principles. Section I investigates
the problem of discrimination in mortgage lending. Section II addresses
the regulatory framework and the limits of the CRA, as well as methods
of enforcing CRA standards. Financial modernization, specifically the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"), and the phenomenon of internet
banking are the focuses of Section III. Particular provisions of the
GLBA, which weaken the CRA, are scrutinized, along with the effects of
internet banking on the CRA. Section IV proposes solutions to
strengthen CRA principles in light of financial modernization and
technology.
1. See generally THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A
REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE (Margery Austin Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1999)
(claiming homeownership increases individuals' stake in their future, which strengthens
neighborhoods and sense of control over life), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/mortgagejlending.pdf.
2. Id.
3. David H. Harris, Jr., Using the Law to Break Discriminatory Barriers to Fair
Lending for Home Ownership, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 101, 101 (1996).
4. For the majority, access to credit is necessarily essential in the home-buying
process. Harris, supra note 3, at 101.
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I. THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF MORTGAGE
LENDING DISCRIMINATION
Prejudicial practices in mortgage lending have persisted throughout
history.5 Since the Reconstruction Era, minorities have encountered dis-
crimination in housing and lending.6 Despite the enactment of the Fair
Housing Act,7 prohibiting discrimination in real estate transactions, and
the Equal Opportunity Act,' proscribing discrimination in denying credit,
discriminatory practices in mortgage lending are nevertheless
widespread.
A. Recent Studies Evidencing Mortgage Discrimination
Housing Discrimination Study 2000 ("HDS 2000") is a recent study re-
leased by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 9
HDS 2000 revealed the presence of housing discrimination at unaccept-
able levels, specifically for Hispanic and African American homebuyers,
as well as Asians and Native Americans. 0 Caucasian homebuyers were
particularly preferred over minorities-the study documented non-mi-
nority homebuyers were favored over African Americans in 17% of the
tests, and favored in 19.7% of the tests over Hispanics. 1 Specifically,
non-minority buyers enjoyed more information and assistance in financ-
ing aspects, further opportunities to inspect homes, additional encourage-
ment not offered to minority buyers, and were more likely to be shown
homes in non-minority neighborhoods.' 2 Additionally, the study found
increases in "geographic steering," a trend encouraging individuals to buy
homes in neighborhoods of their same race.' 3
Complementing the HDS 2000 study, the National Fair Housing Alli-
ance ("NFHA") conducted a study that revealed lending discrimination
5. Id. at 102.
6. See id. (alleging historical discrimination during the Reconstruction Era regarding
credit to raise crops and buy or build a home, specifically towards African Americans).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination in the residential real estate
market and real estate related transactions).
8. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1693f (1994) (prohibiting discrim-
ination of a creditor against an applicant in any credit transaction).
9. THE URBAN INsUT'rE: METROPOLITAN HOUSING & COMMUNITIES, DISCRIMINA-
TION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE 1 HDS
2000 (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/Phasel-Report.pdf.
10. The study conducted 4,600 paired tests in 23 cities nationwide during 2000, each
pair consisting of a minority and a non-minority posing as identical homebuyers. HDS is
the third pair-testing study by HUD measuring discrimination in housing markets. Id at iv.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 8.
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in the mortgage application process.14 The study contains results from
audits conducted by fair housing organizations using testers posing as re-
financers or first-time homebuyers.' 5 NFHA evidenced lenders denying
information to minorities during the application phase. 6 Specifically,
lenders discouraged minorities from participating in the process by urging
them to find other lenders and representing that "procedures would be
long and complicated.' 17 Though equally qualified, minorities were
quoted higher mortgage rates or experienced outright repudiation, while
non-minorities received assistance in correcting credit problems and addi-
tional information on various types of loan products.' HDS 2000 and
the NFHA study discernibly evidence minority discrimination in the lend-
ing process.
Further discriminatory practices consist of discouraging minorities
from applying for a loan, rejecting loan applications from minorities, or
implementing harsh, adverse loan terms despite creditworthiness.' 9 Mi-
norities also face discrimination in the automated underwriting process.2°
The underwriting process may "give greater points to applicants from ge-
ographic areas that are predominately white than to applicants from geo-
graphic areas that are predominately minority.",2 1
Additional instances of lending discrimination are discussed by the
Federal Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending. According to the Task
Force policy, a lender may not:
(1) fail to provide information or services or provide different infor-
mation or services regarding any aspect of the lending process, in-
cluding credit availability, application procedures, or lending
standards; (2) discourage or selectively encourage applicants with re-
spect to inquiries about or applications for credit; (3) refuse to ex-
tend credit or using different standards in determining whether to
extend credit; (4) vary the terms of credit offered, including the
14. Id. at iv.
15. THE URaA INSrrruTE, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. THE URBAN INsTrruTE, supra note 9.
19. HUD, together with the regulatory agencies overseeing CRA compliance of finan-
cial institutions, adopted this policy statement describing the general principles the agen-
cies will consider in identifying discriminatory practices in lending and violations of the
FHA and ECOA. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266,
18268 (proposed Apr. 15, 2004).
20. See Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Can New Americans Achieve the American Dream?:
Promoting Homeownership in Immigrant Communities, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 169,
186 (2004) (arguing that because minorities are of differing racial groups than mortgage
lenders, they face more discrimination in the underwriting process).
21. Id. at 184.
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amount, interest rate, duration, or type of loan; (5) use different
standards to evaluate collateral; and (6) treat a borrower differently
in servicing a loan or invoking default remedies.22
Undeniably, discriminatory lending practices are rampant throughout
the mortgage process. In an attempt to solve discrimination, the legisla-
ture drafted, adopted, and amended the Community Reinvestment Act.23
Though the CRA has manifested positive results in lending discrimina-
tion, recent campaigns threaten CRA principles. As discussed below, fi-
nancial modernization and the rise of internet banking may substantially
compromise the future of the CRA. Without modernizing the CRA, its
conviction towards assuring fair lending and community reinvestment will
eventually become obsolete.
II. THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
TO LENDING DISCRIMINATION
Adopted in 1977, the CRA encourages banks to reinvest in their local
communities, particularly in low and moderate-income neighborhoods.24
Specifically, the Act requires each financial institution to "demonstrate
that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the com-
munities in which they are chartered to do business. '25 The congres-
sional intent behind the CRA stems from a desire to cure the underlying
evils of mortgage discrimination, redlining, and disinvestment.26 The
Act's purpose is to remedy geographical disparities in allocating credit,
specifically in lower-income communities.27
A. Redlining and Disinvestment
Redlining, a historic practice, is specifically termed from the process of
"outlining in red certain poor neighborhoods on a map ... in order to
indicate areas considered too high a risk for lending." 28 The systematic
22. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. at 18267-68.
23. See Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (2004).
24. The CRA requires each federal agency to use its authority upon examining finan-
cial institutions to encourage the institution to meet the needs of the local community and
ensure that the institution serves the community's needs with safe and sound operation.
See id.
25. Id. at § 2901(a)(1).
26. Marcia Johnson et al., The Community Reinvestment Act: Expanding Access, 12
KArN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 89, 90 (2002). One factor associated with redlining is community
disinvestment. Id.
27. Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic The-
ory, Econometric Evidence, and The Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 237
(1996).
28. Johnson et al., supra note 26, at 90.
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denial of extending credit based on the applicant's community of resi-
dence is still practiced by institutions today.29 According to some, finan-
cial risk is not the motive behind redlining, rather the practice stems from
impermissible racial prejudice.3 ° Considerations of individual character-
istics, such as creditworthiness, are purely fictional. 3 ' This geographic
practice of denying loans inauspiciously impacts minorities who reside in
redlined communities.
The other evil Congress intended to ameliorate by enacting the CRA is
community disinvestment.32 This materializes when banks accept local
deposits and reinvest the funds outside the local community.33 In other
words, a financial institution practicing disinvestment invests all of its de-
posits outside the community of origin. This invidious practice removes
financial resources from the community the bank serves.3 4
The combination of redlining and community disinvestment produces a
disconcerting cycle. Lenders conclude redlined communities are poor
collateral; rather than extending credit to these communities, credit is
tendered elsewhere.3 5 Mortgage loans, a type of credit, are denied in red-
lined communities or are offered only under adverse terms. As a result,
the community's net worth decreases. This diminution reaffirms the be-
lief that the community is poor collateral. Consequently, credit is never
extended to the community. Redlined residents are deprived of the pos-
sibility of becoming homeowners - an opportunity that would increase
the value of their neighborhoods and influence banks to reinvest in their
community.
B. The Regulatory Policy of the CRA
The CRA is exclusively applicable to banks.3 6 To comply with the
CRA, banks must lend to low and moderate-income communities.37
More specifically, banks must satisfy the CRA requirements in three ex-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 90-91 (alleging banks refused to lend to redlined-individuals on the basis of
race).
31. Id. at 91.
32. Id. at 92.
33. Id.
34. David Evan Cohen, Comment, The Community Reinvestment Act - Asset or Lia-
bility?, 75 MARO. L. REv. 599, 601 (1992).
35. See id. (contending that lenders typically refuse to extend loans to redlined com-
munities because they view such communities as poor collateral).
36. Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate's
Guide to Making the CRA Work for Communities, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 129, 134
(2000).
37. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2903(a).
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plicit substantive areas: community delineation, disclosure, and
compliance.38
The first requirement, delineating the community served, is for the
bank to define independently.39 Though autonomous in this aspect,
banks may not exclude low or moderate-income communities.4" Further,
the contiguous area surrounding the financial institution must be
included.4
Initially, the disclosure requirement directed institutions to post a CRA
notice at each branch.42 Notice informs the public on methods for acces-
sing the institution's CRA performance and submitting comments about
the institution's CRA compliance. 43 A 1989 amendment consummated
more stringent disclosure requirements." Institutions must publicly
make available a CRA statement including its community delineation
and information regarding the type of credit extended in the
community.45
CRA compliance, the third requirement, is measured by a composite
rating determined from three tests initialized during review. 46 First, the
lending test measures the institution's record of equitable lending in
terms of mortgages, small business, and farm lending.47 Second, the in-
vestment test examines the amount of investments made within the com-
munity.48 The dollar amount, along with the innovativeness and
complexity of the investments, are scrutinized. 49 Lastly, the service test
analyzes the availability of services, the distribution of branches, and the
methodology for creating accessible banking services for low and moder-
ate-income communities.50 Upon completion of these tests, the regula-
tory agency assigns a rating for the institution; the ratings include
"outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs to improve," or "substantial non-
compliance., 51
38. A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1431, 1459 (1994-1995).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1460.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Johnson et al., supra note 26, at 95.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Overby, supra note 38, at 1472.
51. Mark A. Malaspina, Special to the National Law Journal, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 6, 2002,
at B9.
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C. Enforcing the CRA's Regulatory Policies
Two indirect mechanisms assist in enforcing CRA compliance: regula-
tory review and community groups. The first device, regulatory review, is
provided by the CRA.5 2 The Act delegates enforcement to four specific
regulatory agencies; under this authority the agencies examine banks for
compliance.53 The agencies are assigned to review institutions based on
the type of bank the agency regulates.54 The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency manages national banks, the Office of Thrift Supervision
oversees savings associations, the FDIC regulates state chartered banks
and savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve, and
lastly, the Federal Reserve regulate state chartered banks.55
An agency's reviewing power is only invoked in two isolated situations:
review transpires during the periodic CRA examination or upon a bank's
request to modify its structure.56 A request to modify structure typically
follows when a bank applies to "obtain a charter, obtain deposit insur-
ance, establish a branch, relocate a home office or branch, merge with
another bank, or obtain the assets or assume the liabilities of another
bank."57 The agency may deny the restructure application if the institu-
tion has received a poor CRA rating.58 However, substantial deference is
granted to the reviewing agency,59 a deference that may cause agencies to
grant applications that should in fact be denied.
As a result of this deference, enforcement through the second indirect
mechanism is imperative to ensure institutions remain accountable to the
communities they serve.' This intermediary is the "community group., 61
As one commentator has emphasized, "The success or failure of the CRA
currently rests in the hands of community groups. The energy, activism,
and sophistication of these groups can affect the conduct of financial in-
stitutions and the amount of attention regulators focus on lenders.",62
52. Regulatory agencies are required to use their authority when examining financial
institutions for CRA compliance. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
53. Marsico, supra note 36, at 135.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 137.
58. See id. at 138.
59. See id. (arguing that courts afford substantial deference to regulatory agencies in
application decisions).
60. Cohen, supra note 34, at 613 (contending that the role of community groups is
vital to the CRA enforcement).
61. Id.
62. See id.
[Vol. 7:229
MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION SAFEGUARDS
Community groups have two primary means of highlighting an institu-
tion's CRA compliance rating.63 Groups may file a criticism regarding
the failure to comply with CRA lending.64 Such comments will be added
to the institution's public file and may receive special inquiry by the over-
seeing regulatory agency.65 Alternatively, groups may protest.66 Agency
response is almost guaranteed by this method.67 In sum, community
groups can influence banks to comply with CRA principles and, thereby,
influence lending policy.68
D. Limitations of the CRA
The CRA is a positive piece of legislation. It encourages banks to rein-
vest in local communities and assists in alleviating mortgage discrimina-
tion.69 Nonetheless, the Act suffers from notable limits. For instance, the
CRA does not provide for a private cause of action.7" Further bounda-
ries are exacerbated by the adoption of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as
well as the trend of technological modernization.
As initially drafted, the CRA is unduly vague and broad.7" Critics of
the Act's language have remarked that "regulations are framed so
broadly that they provide little guidance for institutions on how compli-
ance will be measured."72 As one commentator contends, the CRA fails
to establish loan allocations or lending goals for low-income neighbor-
hoods,7 3 and it also fails to proscribe specific activities such as redlining
or disinvestment.7" Although the CRA attempts to restrict these prac-
tices, "it fails to establish a comprehensive legislative scheme for remedy-
ing such abuses.",75
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Robert G. Schwemm, Introduction to Mortgage Lending Discrimination Law, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 317, 320 (1995).
71. See Cohen, supra note 34, at 613 (pointing out that the CRA is often criticized for
being so vague as to render it meaningless).
72. Id.
73. See Richard D. Marsico, Fighting Poverty Through Community Empowerment and
Economic Development: The Role of the Community Reinvestment and Home Mortgage
Disclosure Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281, 284 (1995) (stressing that the CRA's
lack of loan quotas for low-income neighborhoods is one of the Act's limits).
74. See Cohen, supra note 34, at 613 (contending that the CRA does not specifically
address the problem of redlining or a methodology to prohibit it).
75. Id.
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One restrictive limit is the CRA's model of "local bank consumer par-
ticipation."76 The local bank consumer model encompasses the idea that
individuals go to the local community bank to make deposits, apply for
loans, and engage in other banking activities. 77 This model envisions con-
sumers participating in banking services, such as making deposits or ap-
plying for loans, at their local branch office. 78 However, current local
banking is archaic. As a result of financial modernization and the growth
of internet banks, local community banking is superseded by a national
banking paradigm.79 Therefore, to maintain an enforceable presence in
the banking industry, CRA policy must be realigned to apply to a na-
tional banking framework.
Currently, the CRA applies solely to banks insured under the FDIC or
OTS.8° It does not extend to independent mortgage companies, commu-
nity credit unions," or financial affiliates of banks.82 Consequently, the
CRA's limited reach leaves vital lending institutions unrestrained by
CRA compliance standards.
Certain provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) dissimu-
late CRA enforceability.8 3 As a result of the GLBA, "banks aren't sim-
ply banks anymore."' 4 The Act reconstructed the financial services
industry, allowing banks to engage in activities previously proscribed.85
Banks may now partner with investment or securities firms to become
financial holding companies.86 As a result of the growth of these holding
76. Susan R. Jones, Planting Money Where It's Needed Most: A Look at the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act After 25 Years, Bus. L. TODAY, Nov. - Dec. 2003, at 47.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Robert W. Dixon, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act: Why
Reform in the Financial Services Industry Was Necessary and the Act's Projected Effect on
Community Banking, 49 DRAKE L. REv. 671, 676 (2001).
80. Jonathan P. Tomes, The "Community" in the Community Reinvestment Act. A
Term in Search of a Definition, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 225, 230 (1991).
81. See Liz Laderman, Has the CRA Increased Lending For Low-Income Home
Purchases?, ECON. LETTERS (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco), June 25, 2004, at 1,
available at http://www.frbsLorg/publications/economics/letter/2004/el2OO4-16.html.
82. See Tomes, supra note 80, at 230-31.
83. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act (GLBA), 12 U.S.C. § 1843
(2004).
84. Jones, supra note 76, at 47-48.
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
86. Previously, banks were not permitted to engage in non-banking activities. David
L. Glass, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Overview of the Key Provisions: Presentation
Before the State of New York Banking Department, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 1-2
(2000). However, in 1999 Congress approved the GLBA permitting banks to expand their
permissible financial activities. Id.
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companies, the number of CRA-exempt institutions has increased.87
Covered institutions may manipulate CRA ratings by shifting assets to
non-covered affiliates. The GLBA also conveys the perception that CRA
exams are more lenient.88 Furthermore, GLBA's sunshine provision and
its conflicting standards for different banks negate CRA principles.89
Additionally, technological advances in the banking industry impact
CRA provisions. The movement towards internet banking questions the
CRA's definition of 'community.'9 ° Moreover, this luxury may act as a
form of discrimination. Individuals unable to obtain personal computers
and internet service, the majority of whom are minorities, are left without
online access to credit.
III. THE IMPACr OF THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT AND INTERNET
BANKING ON THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AcT
A. Financial Modernization: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 drastically changed the structure
of the financial world.91 The Act, repealing the Depression Era's banking
framework, allows financial institutions to merge with insurance compa-
nies and securities underwriting firms for the first time in history.92 In
essence, new financial holding companies are permitted to engage in any
type of financial activity. Opponents of the Act, many of whom are com-
munity bank proponents, view the legislation as reducing regulatory safe-
guards and consumer choice.93 The result of the permissible merging is
the birth of immeasurable financial institutions.94 Localism will be re-
placed.95 Inevitably, these money-making conglomerates are predisposed
87. Deborah Goldberg, Remarks of Deborah Goldberg, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
67, 68 (2000-2001).
88. See NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. OTR., THIs OLD REG: THE COMMUNITY REINVEST-
MENT Acr NEEDS RENOVATION 10 (2002), available at http://www.ntic-us.org/cur-
rentevents/press/pdf/Findings.pdf (alleging that the current rating system is geared toward
passing financial institutions).
89. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
90. Cheryl R. Lee, Cyberbanking: A New Frontier for Discrimination?, 26 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 277, 289 (2000).
91. Martin E. Lybecker, Financial Holding Companies and New Financial Activities of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, SJ071 AI-ABA 75 (2004) (stating that if an institution elects
to become a financial holding company, permissible activities include those that are "finan-
cial in nature or incidental to such financial activity").
92. See Dixon, supra note 79, at 671-72.
93. Id. at 675-76 (contending that the enactment of the GLBA would create huge
financial institutions limiting consumer choice).
94. See id. at 676.
95. Lawrence J. White, Financial Modernization: What's in it for Local Communities?,
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 115, 121 (2000-2001).
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with new business ventures rather than community banking. "Financial
institutions have gained unprecedented powers and privileges, and yet
they have not been asked to assume any more responsibility to serve un-
derserved communities." 96 Not only does the GLBA hinder progress for
community reinvestment, certain provisions of the Act directly impede
CRA success.
1. The Small Bank Provision
The GLBA changed the CRA's small bank provision. Presently,
smaller institutions, with assets under $250 million, are only subject to
CRA exams every four or five years, depending on their current CRA
rating.97 Institutions with an "outstanding" grade are subject to review
every five years and those deemed "satisfactory" are reviewed every four
years.98
The rationale behind the alteration included lessening the regulatory
burden of smaller institutions.9 9 However, the provision "is unlikely to
reduce the regulatory burden for them, because their safety and sound-
ness and consumer compliance examinations will not be on shorter cycles,
and their CRA exams, although less frequent, will cover more time."'"
Therefore, smaller institutions will not affirmatively benefit from the
weakened provision.11 On the other hand, the likelihood of affliction to
local communities and the minorities served by smaller banks is consider-
able. Communities will be less successful in influencing institutions to
engage in CRA lending. Banks on the infrequent exam cycle may dis-
count CRA compliance the first two years after an exam. Community
focus will only manifest shortly before the institution's review. Thus,
fewer exams will promote reinvestment considerations only before regu-
latory review rather than on a permanent basis.
96. Malcolm Bush & Katy Jacob, Financial "Progress" Leaves Communities Behind,
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/108/wood-
stock.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
97. John Taylor, Treasury Underestimates the Damage that Gramm-Leach-Bliley Did
to CRA, AM. BANKER, Feb. 2, 2001, at 14; Deborah Goldberg, Remarks of Goldberg supra
note 87, at 69.
98. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 69.
99. Prior to the Act, small banks were required to comply with the CRA in the same
manner and under the same exam schedule as larger institutions. Richard D. Marsico,
Forward to Symposium, Financial Modernization: The Effect of the Repeal of the Glass-
Stegall Act on Consumers and Communities, 17 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. Rs. i, vi (2000-2001).
The GLBA reduced this burden for small banks by requiring a review every four to five
years. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
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In addition to disconnecting CRA requirements because of the small
bank provision, clientele served by smaller institutions will also suffer.
This clientele encompasses a majority of the public. "The lower fre-
quency [of exams] will apply to 80 percent of all banks and thrifts."10
Consequently, a meager 20 percent of banks will remain CRA accounta-
ble on a permanent basis. A great more than a majority of those served
will be served by banks who are remotely concerned with CRA compli-
ance. Therefore, under the new provision, a substantial number of clien-
tele will be served by financial institutions who are distantly concerned in
reinvesting in the community served.
2. Exempt Institutions
The GLBA neglects expanding CRA principles to other segments of
the financial industry.' 3 Banking institutions covered by the GLBA are
comprised of traditional banks and their affiliates, as well as insurance
and securities firms. 10 4 However, only traditional banks are subjected to
CRA review.'0 5
Performance of an institution's non-CRA affiliates is not a mandatory
part of the institution's CRA examination. Banks have the option to
choose inclusion of affiliates and subsidiaries in their CRA exam."0 6 This
choice may lead to potential manipulation of CRA ratings. 0 7 A bank
may opt not to include an affiliate that might have an adverse effect on its
rating. The inclusion option renders CRA ratings that fail to reflect an
accurate representation of an institution's lending practices.'0 8
For example, State Farm Insurance, a financial firm, offers savings ac-
counts, checking accounts, money market accounts, insurance, and home
mortgage and equity loans.'0 9 Included in Paine Webber's services are
insured deposits and home mortgages." 0 Merrill Lynch offers checking
102. Vincent Di Lorenzo, Financial Services Modernization Provides an Opportunity
for Increased Responsiveness to Community Needs, 10 J. AFFORDABLE Hous. & CoMTY.
DEV. L. 177, 187 (2001).
103. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 68.
104. See generally Bush & Jacob, supra note 96.
105. See Goldberg, supra note 87, at 68.
106. Under current CRA rules, institutions have the option of including affiliates in
their CRA exam. See GAIL PARSON, OUTSIDE THE LAW: How LENDERS DODGE COMMU-
NITY REINVESTMENT 9 (rev. ed. 2003), available at http://www.ntic-us.org/issues/cra/out-
sidethelaw/Report.pdL
107. See NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CTR., supra note 86, at 10 (recognizing that under
the current regulation institutions have the option to include affiliates in or out of their
CRA exam).
108. See id.
109. Lorenzo, supra note 102, at 179.
110. Id.
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accounts and home mortgages.111 These depository institutions may
"choose to have affiliate activities considered when regulators assess
compliance with the CRA regulations' lending, service and investment
tests.",112 The power of companies like Merrill Lynch and their affiliates
creates the ability to manipulate ratings. 113 Rarely would an institution
undertake necessary steps to insure CRA compliance of its affiliates
when inclusion of the affiliates is optional." 4 If an affiliate threatens the
institution's CRA rating, the affiliate will simply be excluded from
review.
As many affiliates are exempt from CRA review, they may offer ad-
verse loans or deny credit to the low-income residents the CRA was en-
acted to protect." 5 Opponents of the Act believe "banks should not be
permitted to avoid CRA obligations when their affiliates conduct lending
activity.""' 6 Indeed, all lending activity, whether conducted by banks or
bank affiliates, should come under CRA review. 117
Since the adoption of the CRA, and partially due to enactment of the
GLBA, the number of CRA-covered institutions has steeply declined." 8
The increase in institutions not covered by the CRA exceeds 70%." 9 In
addition to exempt affiliates, the GLBA omits extending CRA compli-
ance to mortgage lending institutions or credit unions.120 For example, in
2000, private mortgage companies in Boston maintained 70% of the mar-
ket share of mortgage loans, which is a significant increase from 29% in
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Malaspina, supra note 51, at B9 (illustrating GLBA does not prevent a finan-
cial holding company from shifting assets to non-CRA covered institutions).
114. See Timothy R. McTaggart et al., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provisions Relating to
CRA and Community Development (1999), available at http://library.lp.findlaw.com/arti-
cles/file/00105/000756/title/Subject/topic/Finance%20and%Banking-Bank%2OHolding%
20Companies/filename/financeandbanking-l_550 (identifying that instead of insuring
CRA compliance, institutions may simply close institutions which fail to meet compliance
standards).
115. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902(2) (defining "regulated financial institutions" to which the
Act extends to as insured depository institutions); see also Johnson et al., supra note 26, at
100 (noting that the GLBA allows banks to partner with affiliates permitting banks to elect
organizing themselves as institutions other than insured depository institutions, such as
financial holding companies or form financial subsidiaries).
116. Don Allen Resnikoff, The Consumer Advocates v. The Banks: Public Debate of
Regulation Issues Survives Passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act, 12 Lo'.
CONSUMER L. REV. 284, 291 (2000).
117. Id.
118. See generally Bush & Jacob, supra note 96.
119. Id.
120. Id.
[Vol. 7:229
MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION SAFEGUARDS
1980.121 Absent inclusion of mortgage lenders, the GLBA stimulates in-
creases in the amount of home mortgages originated in institutions not
covered by the CRA.' 22
Lastly, covered institutions are only required to maintain a minimum
CRA rating before the institution may permissibly change structure by
incorporating one or more affiliates. 123 The GLBA does not stipulate a
penalty if an institution does not maintain a satisfactory rating after the
approval of the expansion.' 24 Following approval, the newly incorpo-
rated affiliate is not covered under the CRA.1
25
3. Grade Inflation
As a result of financial modernization, CRA grades have inflated.
126
CRA compliance is no longer regarded as strict; almost any institution
will pass regardless of their lending practices. 27 A recent study, con-
ducted by the Greenlining Institute, reports that "barely 1% of banks and
thrifts received a 'substantial noncompliance' grade, the equivalent of an
F, in the 860 exams conducted last year.' 128 The National Training and
Information Center ("NTIC") states "97 percent of banks receive a satis-
factory or outstanding rating on their CRA exams.' 29 One regulatory
agency was condemned for dispensing a disproportionately high number
of top grades.130 The current rating system is clearly geared toward pass-
ing an institution, regardless of its record of community reinvestment. 3'
One of the NTIC's policy recommendations is to construct CRA rat-
ings that more adequately reflect a bank's performance. 132 Currently, if a
bank receives a meager 46 out of 100 points, the bank still receives a
"satisfactory" rating.133 The lower rating of "needs to improve" falls be-
tween 21 to 42 percent of compliance.134 So, if a "passing" grade is over-
121. Peter Dreier, The Future of Community Reinvestment: Challenges and Opportu-
nities in a Changing Environment, J. AM. PLANNING ASSN., Sept. 22, 2003, at 341.
122. See Lorenzo, supra note 102, at 178.
123. See generally McTaggart et al., supra note 114.
124. Id..
125. Id.
126. Brad Berton & Susan Futterman, Community Groups See Continuing "Chill" on
CRA (Oct. 2, 2002) (on file with author).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Nat'l Training & Info Center, NTIC's Proposed Changes to the CRA (2003), at
http://www.ntic-us.org/issues/cra/cra-proposed-changes.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
130. See Berton & Futterman, supra note 126.
131. See generally NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CrR., supra note 88, at 17.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
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whelmingly likely, why would an institution strive to emulate superior
CRA lending policies?
Grade inflation renders the rating system a wholly ineffective tool for
measuring compliance, as Greenlining's executive director contends.135
When one in five institutions receive an "outstanding" rating and none
receive a "needs to improve" rating, how can one decipher which institu-
tions actually need to improve? Grade inflation, resulting from relaxed
CRA provisions due to enactment of the GLBA 3 6 , serves no motiva-
tional function for institutions to be concerned with community lending.
Instead, the overwhelming probability of passing the CRA exam, despite
arbitrary lending policies, motivates institutions to be concerned with an-
ything but community reinvestment.
4. The Sunshine Provision
Perhaps the most deterring provision of the GLBA to the CRA is the
controversial "sunshine provision." This provision requires all CRA
agreements between banks and community groups to be disclosed pub-
licly.' 37 The provision is burdensome for banks and community groups,
resulting in the discouragement of community focused lending
agreements.
During the drafting phase of the GLBA, Senator Phil Gramm, the
leading proponent and namesake of the GLBA, verbally agreed with for-
mer President Clinton that the provision would endorse only a "compre-
hensive" disclosure requirement. 138 However, the final bill required a
detailed and itemized list of expenditures made pursuant to CRA agree-
ments.' 39 Penalties are imposed on nonprofit organizations for failing to
disclose CRA agreement; however, banks are not penalized for failure to
disclose agreements. 140 The apparent initiative behind the stringent dis-
closure requirement stems from a contrived notion that CRA lending
agreements are suspect. 14
Under the sunshine provision, community groups and lenders are re-
quired to fully and publicly disclose agreements made in connection with
135. See Berton & Futterman, supra note 126.
136. See NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CR., supra note 88, at 10 (stating that community
groups believe financial modernization has allowed banks to reduce lending in low and
moderate-income communities).
137. See Taylor, supra note 97.
138. See generally Bush & Jacob, supra note 96.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally McTaggart et al., supra note 114.
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the CRA.112 Covered agreements include loans to community groups be-
tween the amount of $10,000 and $50,000."' Banks are required, at the
least, to file annual reports to regulatory agencies detailing the
agreement. 14
4
In his article Financial Modernization: What's in it for Local Communi-
ties?, Michael S. Bylsma states:
A financial institution must report annually to its federal regulator
on the fees, payments, or loans it makes to or receives from other
parties to a covered agreement and on the terms and conditions of
these payments, fees, or loans. The annual report also must include
aggregate data on the loans, investments, and services each party
provides under a covered agreement. 145
The community group must report the use of funds in an itemized list,
including "compensation, administrative expenses, travel, entertainment,
and consulting and professional fees.' 1 46
The sunshine provision imparts a "chilling effect on CRA activity."'14 7
The extensive and burdensome requirements discourage lenders from
lending to community groups and community groups from pursuing CRA
agreements.148 Even proponents of the GLBA admit the legislation will
lead to higher compliance costs. 14 9 Requiring additional reports from
lenders, already weary of CRA compliance, serves as a deterrent to meet
and work with community groups. The regulatory burdens of the sun-
shine provision will undoubtedly result in fewer CRA agreements.
Community groups will suffer from the compliance demands. Addi-
tional labor and financial resources will be required to persevere through
the extensive disclosure prerequisites. 5 ' Unfortunately, most commu-
nity groups are nonprofit organizations or operate on a low budget and
142. See Michael S. Bylsma, Financial Modernization: What's in it for Local Commu-
nities?, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 39, 47 (2000).
143. Id. at 48.
144. Id. at 49.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Marsico, supra note 99, at vi.
148. See id. at vi-vii (describing the "chilling effect," as termed by Deborah Goldberg
of the Center for Community Change, as the resulting discouragement of lenders and com-
munity groups to participate in CRA-related lending due to the increased burdens imposed
by the GLBA).
149. Press Release, Dept. of Treasury, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fi-
nancial Modernization: A Final Report (Jan. 2001), available at http:I/www.treas.gov/pressl
releases/reports/finalrpt.pdf.
150. See NAT'L. TRAINING & INFO. CTR, supra note 106.
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do not have resources readily available.15' Community groups will be
confronted with a choice: either they will forgo lending agreements or
they will disobey the law by disregarding disclosure requirements. Over-
all, the provision will discourage "the partnerships that have emerged be-
tween banks and community groups, both of which have been
fundamental to CRA's success.' 1 52
The president of the NCRC contends "the sunshine statute strikes at
the heart of the CRA."' 53 The CRA strives to encourage members of the
public to address the credit needs of their community. 154 Communities
have the right to seek reinvestment opportunities and inform banks about
the positive aspects of lending.155 However, it is unlikely banks will ap-
preciate the positive prospects of CRA lending while under the stringent
disclosure requirements. The sunshine provision renders CRA-related
lending suspect by requiring disclosure. 156 Consequently, successful part-
nerships between community groups and lenders will diminish.'57 John
Taylor, NCRC's president, argues that the sunshine provision will impede
lending to low-income communities because it scrutinizes the private sec-
tor activities of financial institutions.
Accompanying the disclosure requirements, the sunshine provision
may also implicate the First Amendment.'58 The National Reinvestment
Coalition argues the provision violates basic First Amendment principles
as it infringes on the public's right to free speech.' 59 When free speech is
imposed upon by the enactment of a statute, Congress must articulate a
substantial and compelling need to justify the law. However, the sun-
shine requirement fails to demonstrate a compelling reason that justifies
the infringement of free speech rights."6
151. See Johnson et al., supra note 26, at 101 (asserting that the cost of reporting will
dissipate community group funds).
152. Marsico, supra note 99, at vii.
153. Press Release, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, CRA Sunshine
Melts First Amendment Rights and Community Reinvestment (July 11, 2000) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Press Release].
154. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901.
155. See Press Release, supra note 153 (contending that the public has the right to
articulate credit needs to financial institutions).
156. See 12 U.S.C. §1831y(a); see also Taylor, supra note 97, at 14.
157. Press Release, supra note 153.
158. Id.
159. See id. (highlighting the NCRC's proposition that the CRA violates First Amend-
ment rights) (on file with author).
160. See id. (stating that namesake of the GLBA, Phil Gramm, failed to demonstrate a
compelling need for the law).
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B. The Technological Divide and Internet Banking
1. Internet Banking Basics
Congress, by enacting the GLBA, reduced regulation within the bank-
ing industry.' 6 ' One thing Congress failed to address in the Act was the
rise of internet banking and the resulting effect on the CRA.16 2
Many of the 1977 CRA founders had never anticipated the internet. 163
The concept of cyberbanking was unfathomable. Since the CRA's enact-
ment, technology has transformed the banking business."6 Many institu-
tions offer a full service financial center online, including balance inquiry,
165 tfund and wire transfers, access to checking and savings accounts, loan
and mortgage application and information, credit cards, and bill pay-
ment."6 Though perhaps beneficial to the majority of customers, many
minorities are adversely affected from the technological trends of
cyberbanking.167
Congress denied addressing cyberbanking in the GLBA. 168 Due to this
congressional inaction, the overseeing regulatory agencies, community
groups, and banks are left to solve the problem of complying with the
CRA upon chartering an internet bank. 69 The CRA is a federal piece of
legislation and inescapably cyberbanks and regulatory agencies must
comply with the Act's mandates or face the potential problem of preemp-
tion.' 70 Regulatory agencies have a clear dilemma: appease Congress by
confining cyberbanks to the vague language of the CRA while encounter-
161. See generally Bush & Jacob, supra note 96 (alleging that the GLBA will result in
financial institutions having unprecedented power).
162. See Oliver A. Thoenen, Functional Obsolescence: The Community Reinvestment
Act and the Dilemma of Internet Banking Regulation, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 425,
428 (2001).
163. See John Reosti, Internet Banks Challenged by CRA Requirements, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 18, 2000, at 11.
164. See Lee, supra note 90, at 284 (identifying new technological services banks cur-
rently offer).
165. John L. Douglas, Cyberbanking: Legal and Regulatory Considerations for Bank-
ing Organizations, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 73 (2000).
166. Lee, supra note 90, at 284.
167. See Doug Anderson, PC Banking: A Brief Overview, CREDIT WORLD, Mar.-Apr.
1997, at 33; see also Lee, supra note 90, at 288 (alleging that many minorities do not have
internet access in their homes and therefore lack easy access to online credit
opportunities).
168. See Thoenen, supra note 162, at 428.
169. See William M. Keyser, The 21st Century CRA: How Internet Banks are Causing
Regulators to Rethink the Community Reinvestment Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 545, 546
(2000) (contending that traditional brick-and-mortar banks are being replaced for alterna-
tive methods, such as the internet).
170. See id. at 564 (illustrating agencies must choose to comply or overstep legislative
authority).
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ing increased criticism by community groups, or adopt an alternative
method of compliance, potentially overstepping the bounds of the
CRA.
171
As banks gain approval to engage in technological banking, the num-
ber of internet banks will grow.172 In 2000, over one-third of national
banks had internet banking available and 18% of national banks had
plans to undertake cyberbanking practices. 173 With technological im-
provements, cyberbanks will continue to flourish, generating additional
institutions not covered by the CRA.
The growth of internet banks is inevitable. First, as consumers engage
in more web-based transactions, their desire to have convenient, internet
banking options increases. 174 It is simply easier to access funds from
home at anytime of the day or night than it is to physically go to a bank to
do the same. Second, the cost-effectiveness of cyberbanking will fuel
growth.175 Internet banks have much less overhead expenses and trans-
action costs than traditional institutions. 176 Third, the need for opening
new branches diminishes, as does the cost per transaction. 177 Finally, as
internet security fears ease among both banks and consumers, the num-
ber of banks offering online services will grow.178
2. Defining the Internet's "Community"
The first internet bank, Security First Network Bank, received approval
to offer services online in 1995.179 This approval commenced changes to
the banking industry that drastically affect the enforceability of the CRA.
The construction of the CRA is based on a localized banking model; it is
comprised of "regulations for the physical world."' 8 ° Trouble arises when
attempting to define an internet bank's community under the CRA. De-
lineation of the community served is infeasible because cyberbanking is
not localized, but rather takes the form of a national, intangible medium
171. Id.
172. See Miho Kubota, Note, Encouraging Community Development in Cyberspace:
Applying the Community Reinvestment Act to Internet Banks, 5 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 8,
21-23 (1999) (recognizing the factors that will drive the continued growth of internet
banks).
173. Developments in Banking Law: 2001, Electronic Banking, 21 ANN. REV. BANK-
ING L. 58, 58-59 (2002).
174. Kubota, supra note 172, at 20-23.
175. Id. at 21.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 22.
179. Thoenen, supra note 162, at 427.
180. Lee, supra note 90, at 289.
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of which a specific community demarcation is unattainable.' 81 The tradi-
tional "brick and mortar" approach is challenged by cyberbanks. 82
These unique financial institutions have the ability to solicit deposits na-
tionwide while maintaining one physical location.
Internet banks are not subject to geographic boundaries; rather, these
institutions are simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. 83 The director
of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Ellen Seidman, notes that cyberbanks
solicit loans and deposits in cyberspace, illustrating a business strategy
that does not touch any one community.'" She also questions internet
banking and the best means to implement this trend into CRA stan-
dards. 85 The community of an internet bank is possibly the entire na-
tion.'86 Online banking activities are available to all who solicit their
services and send their deposits, regardless of customer location. 8 7 How-
ever, cyberbanks lack a "community" as defined by the CRA. 88
Telebank, another early internet bank, defined its assessment area in
terms of physical location-Arlington, Virginia."89 If, for example,
Telebank collected deposits nationwide, its CRA compliance examination
would only be confined to Virginia. This epitomizes the problem of in-
ternet banking and CRA compliance. Telebank would not be reinvesting
in the numerous communities from which it solicits deposits.
Additionally, the enforceability of the CRA through community
groups is negatively impacted by the proliferation of internet banking."9
Community groups are the most effective vehicle for ensuring that finan-
cial institutions comply with the CRA.' 9' However, a cyberbank is un-
181. Thoenen, supra note 162, at 431 (noting a cyberbank's community is simultane-
ously nowhere and everywhere).
182. Keyser, supra note 169, at 552.
183. See Thomas W. Beetham, The Community Reinvestment Act and Internet Banks:
Redefining the Community, 39 B.C. L. REv. 911, 912 (1998) (asking what constitutes an
internet bank's "community").
184. Ellen Seidman, Remarks at The Consumer Bankers' Ass'n. Annual Conference
(Apr. 26, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/8/87038.pdf).
185. Id.
186. See id.; see also Gary Rice, Selected Issues Relating to Banking and the Internet, in
PLI CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. B-1156 803 (1999).
187. See Kubota, supra note 172, at 26.
188. See generally Seidman, supra note 184 (noting that cyberbanking in its purest
form would consist of all deposits and loan activity taking place in cyberspace, rather than
a local, physical area).
189. Keyser, supra note 169, at 553.
190. See Kubota, supra note 172, at 31 (arguing cyberbanks will not feel the pressure
of community groups because of the dispersed location of customers).
191. See Cohen, supra note 34, at 613 (arguing that the CRA's success depends on
community groups).
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likely to feel pressure from community groups. 192 The "customer base
will be more a function of who has heard about its services and has In-
ternet access than a function of where the customers reside." '19 3 A geo-
graphically dispersed community, such as a nationwide community of
cyberbank customers, is unlikely to ban together, protest, and seek
reinvestment.'94
3. The Digital Divide
Internet access demonstrates a disparity among racial groups fostering
the growth of the "digital divide."'195 Minorities often lack the necessary
tools to engage in internet banking and access to online credit.' 96 To par-
ticipate in cyberbanking, the internet itself is compulsory. Requirements
consist of a computer, telephone line, and internet service. 1 97 The access
to internet is not available to consumers who are unable to obtain these
luxuries.' 98 Moreover, to access online financial tools one must know
how to use the internet and feel comfortable transacting business on-
line.' 9 9 In lieu of computer training and knowledge, traditional banking
methodologies and local transactions are preferred. Without access to
such training or knowledge and the required financial resources, minori-
ties are limited to traditional, antiquated banking methodologies.
2 °°
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. The Profitability of CRA Lending
Arguments may be made against modernizing the CRA or to abolish
the regulatory burdens imposed on financial institutions-specifically,
that the CRA is an outdated vehicle to cure the problem of mortgage
lending discrimination or that the Act is too burdensome on banks in
light of financial and technological advances.20' These may be the argu-
ments extended by financial institutions or the leaders of the GLBA
192. Kubota, supra note 172, at 24.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Anderson, supra note 167, at 33.
196. See id.
197. Lee, supra note 90, at 280.
198. Id.
199. See Beetham, supra note 182, at 926 (implying that the younger generation
utilizes the internet more because of their familiarity with it).
200. See Lee, supra note 90, at 288.
201. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 67.
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movement. 20 2 However, contrary to what most banks postulate, CRA
lending is profitable.2 °3
Modernizing the CRA will not negatively impact financial institu-
tions.2 ' A study conducted by the Federal Reserve Board in 1997 evi-
denced banks which offer more loans to low and moderate-income
borrowers are slightly more profitable than banks that make fewer loans
to these borrowers. 20 5 Consequently, CRA lending has proven profita-
ble. This favorable result will be maintained by modernizing the CRA, in
light of financial and technological advancement. Banking institutions
should therefore regard modernization as advantageous. The final result
will be beneficial to all. Minority borrowers will have the opportunity to
receive fair mortgages and lenders will increase their profits, while giving
back to the community they serve.
B. Proposed Solutions: GLBA
The CRA should be redrafted to include all credit extending institu-
tions. As the GLBA has increased the permissible scope of banking ac-
tivities, the CRA should reflect this change and extend coverage to all
financial activities which banks are permitted to engage in.2' Redrafting
to include new banking activities is a logical and reasonable response to
the GLBA. It would keep the CRA consistent with its original intent:
requiring financial institutions to serve the needs of communities. Cover-
ing all permissible activities by modernizing the CRA will maintain CRA
accountability in all aspects of banking practices.20 7
Furthermore, the CRA should be restructured to include mortgage
companies and credit unions. In 1977, most mortgages originated from
local banking institutions.20 8 Currently, however, the majority of mort-
gages stem from independent mortgage companies.20 9 The exclusion of
mortgage lenders is contrary to the heart of the legislation. Though mort-
gage companies and credit unions do not fall in the traditional confines of
"brick and mortar" institutions, these vital lenders should not be able to
202. Id. at 68 (noting GLBA "falls short of what Chairman Leach would have us be-
lieve is the application of CRA to the insurance and securities branches of financial ser-
vices industry"); see also Goldberg, supra note 87, at 69 (alleging the "chilling effect
appears to be just what the key sponsors of the provision intended").
203. See generally Press Release, supra note 153.
204. Id. (posing CRA lending is profitable for financial institutions).
205. Id.
206. See Resnikoff, supra note 116, at 291.
207. Id. at 293.
208. Di Lorenzo, supra note 102, at 177.
209. Id.
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circumvent reinvesting in communities and providing equal access to
credit.210
Regulatory agencies will be unable to hold mortgage companies, credit
unions, and bank affiliates accountable without redrafting the Act to in-
clude these institutions.211 Without modernization, government agencies
are paralyzed in applying CRA principles to exempt lenders who may be
illegally denying credit. The continued success of banishing the unwanted
practices of redlining and disinvestment is contingent on redrafting to in-
clude the excluded. Upon inclusion, the agencies and the public would
know the extent of the loans allocated.212 As a result of public disclosure,
more institutions would encouragingly adopt impartial lending policies.
In addition to inclusion of all lenders, the CRA exam and grading
structure should be modernized. The GLBA's policies possibly convey
the wrong message to financial institutions that CRA standards are lax
and an institution may easily pass their CRA exam.213 To cure expecta-
tions of leniency, the CRA must be reformed. First, a more stringent
grading policy should be adopted. If there is any evidence of discrimina-
tion, a "satisfactory" rating should be denied.214 Agencies, during an
exam, should closely scrutinize allocated loans and reinvestment activi-
ties. Additionally, each of the three tests-investment, lending, and com-
pliance-should receive a separate grade.215 In computing the overall
grade, if a "substantial non-compliance" or "needs to improve" rating is
received in any one test, the institution should be barred from receiving a
"satisfactory" rating.216 If a lender apportions egregious and adverse
loans to minorities, the institution should receive a "substantial non-com-
pliance" rating.217
Public access and an appeals process for specific grades should be an
additional feature in the new rating process.218 Currently, community
groups do not have the opportunity to appeal inflated grades afforded to
210. See id. at 178-79 (observing the CRA does not extend to mortgage companies
and non-CRA lenders which may result in greater challenges to the credit needs of low and
moderate-income communities).
211. See Goldberg, supra note 87, at 73 (contending that because of their company
classification, mortgage companies and affiliates escape CRA review); see also Taylor,
supra note 97, at 14 (contending the CRA does not cover mortgage companies, financial
holding companies or insurance affiliates).
212. See NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CTR., supra note 88, at 10.
213. See Resnikoff, supra note 116, at 293.
214. NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CTR., supra note 88, at 10.
215. Id.
216. NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. OrR., supra note 129.
217. Id.
218. Id.
[Vol. 7:229
MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION SAFEGUARDS
an institution. 19 Modernizing this aspect would create a system of
checks and balances of power within CRA review. The power of the reg-
ulatory agency to assign grades would be checked with the community
group's ability to appeal a given grade. In turn, regulatory agencies
would afford more time and scrutiny to an institution's lending policies
before designating grades. To minimize against appeals, agencies could
support grades with facts providing an accurate picture of the institution's
lending practices. Accordingly, each institution would be more accounta-
ble to CRA lending policies.
Consistent with modernizing the CRA is the repeal of the small bank
provision. Small banks should be subject to the same exam components
that larger institutions endure, specifically the lending, investment, and
service tests.220 The concept of reviewing a small institution more fre-
quently should be re-institutionalized as well. Smaller institutions gain
little from infrequent exams because when the institution is examined it is
more extensive. The effect of fewer exams is detrimental to communities
as banks become less concerned with CRA lending on a permanent basis.
Maintaining frequent exams for smaller banks instills CRA obligations on
a steadfast basis insuring continual community reinvestment. 22'
Lastly, in light of the GLBA, modernization of the CRA should include
a repeal of the sunshine provision. Abrogation of this provision is sup-
ported by the National Reinvestment Coalition and the FDIC's Vice
Chairman John M. Reich, as it negatively impacts community lending.222
The provision is contrary to the affirmation that CRA agreements in-
crease CRA lending.223
Prior to the sunshine provision, banks approached CRA agreements
negatively due to the extensive regulatory requirements. 224 The sunshine
provision exacerbates this negativity.225 Phil Gramm admitted, "I can
meet with the largest bankers or the smallest bankers . . . and in private
every one of them hates CRA."226 To encourage banks to change their
outlook toward CRA requirements, this counterproductive provision
219. See NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CTR., supra note 88, at 10 (maintaining community
groups cannot challenge inflated ratings).
220. See generally NAT'L TRAINING & INFO. CTR., supra note 129.
221. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 69 (alleging fewer exams are detrimental to the
public).
222. Craig Linder, Reviewing the Rules for CRA: A Provision both Banks, Activists
Want to Erase, AM. BANKER, Aug. 17, 2004, at 1.
223. Taylor, supra note 97, at 14.
224. Linder, supra note 222, at 1.
225. See generally Press Release, supra note 153 (contending that as a result of the
sunshine provision, banks will make fewer CRA agreements due to the extensive disclo-
sure requirements).
226. Di Lorenzo, supra note 102, at 184.
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should be repealed. Its elimination would make CRA agreements less
suspect, while reducing the burdens on both financial institutions and
community groups.
In the alternative, if abrogation is not an option, the sunshine provision
should be redrafted. Primarily, the regulatory burden on community
groups and banks should be reduced.227 Instead of paperwork, the enti-
ties could focus on community lending from which a working relationship
would develop in constructing CRA agreements. 228 Additionally, in re-
drafting the sunshine provision, the penalties imposed on community
groups for non-compliance should be abolished. As bank penalties are
absent from the legislation,229 it is unjust to penalize community groups.
Rather than penalties, the revision should contemplate compensation.23 °
Incentives could be adopted for banks working with community groups to
ensure CRA lending.231 CRA compliance would potentially be inter-
preted as a positive aspect of banking, increasing the willingness to en-
gage in community lending.
C. Proposed Solutions: Internet Banking
Internet banking poses new challenges to CRA lending and advance-
ment. The predominant challenge lies in determining what comprises the
internet's community. The congressional redefinition of the "commu-
nity" in the Community Reinvestment Act should encompass an assess-
ment area based on today's society. 23 2 Instead of reinvesting in the
geographic community surrounding an institution, banks could reinvest
regionally or nationally.233 In accordance with this idea, the regulatory
agencies could identify low-income areas to which banks could direct re-
investment efforts.234 Eliminating the geographic limitations would focus
the lending process on those in need, thereby, reaffirming the core princi-
ple of the CRA.
Alternatively, the term "community" could be replaced by the term
"equality." '235 Basing the CRA on the concept of equality would accom-
plish Congress' fundamental intent of reducing credit discrimination in
227. Marsico, supra note 99, at vi-vu.
228. Thoenen, supra note 162, at 433.
229. See Bush & Jacob, supra note 96.
230. Thoenen, supra note 162, at 442.
231. Id.
232. See generally Seidman, supra note 184.
233. See Lee, supra note 90, at 314-15 (proposing new legislation in which CRA com-
pliance could be gained by reinvestment in the various markets where institutions conduct
business).
234. Kubota, supra note 172, at 40.
235. Beetham, supra note 182, at 928.
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low-income areas.236 The underlying goal would be equal access to ser-
vices; customers would have the opportunity to apply for mortgages and
credit utilizing a non-discriminatory model.2 37 The aspiration of equal
opportunity in the mortgage lending process would be consistent with the
CRA.
Another viable solution would be allowing banks to satisfy CRA re-
quirements by banking with the "unbanked. ' 238 For example, banks
could be responsible for meeting the needs of those who do not have a
checking account or banking services. Institutions could offer individuals
check-cashing services, methods of receiving direct deposits, or a place to
conduct other financial services. Banks could also educate the unbanked
on the benefits of having a bank account and basic banking services.
Furthermore, community redefinition enables banks to develop online
systems without agonizing about geographic delineation. Instead, an in-
stitution could define their area of CRA responsibility by looking to the
location of their customers. Reinvestment would be directed toward the
original location of their deposits.
NetBank's approved 2001 CRA plan is consistent with this idea.2 39
The cyberbank maintains one walk in branch, but operates on a national
basis.240 As a result, the institution needed a national CRA plan. The
approved plan consisted of NetBank delineating its community as the re-
gions where it does the most business, specifically Georgia, Florida, and
California.24' Reinvestment focused specifically in these areas.242
In expanding on the idea of education, internet banks could receive
CRA credit by providing minorities with internet education and access.24 3
Some financial institutions are already undertaking this reputable goal.
Wells Fargo, via "eBuses," is bringing technology into low-income neigh-
borhoods, stopping at libraries, community centers, and schools.2 1 Vol-
unteers invite people into the buses, equipped with internet workstations,
and introduce them to email and other skills such as resume writing.2 45
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Kubota, supra note 172, at 41-42.
239. Megan J. Ptacek, NetBank's CRA Plan Said Approved, AM. BANKER, Mar. 13,
2001, at 17 (illustrating NetBank's CRA plan which has an extended community defined
area).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Jessica Toonkel, Wells and First Union Do Well by Doing Good, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 8, 2000 at 11 (exemplifying educational programs by Wells Fargo and First
Union which receive CRA credit for educating the public).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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Another institution, First Union, began offering free computer training in
the city where it is headquartered.246 This program trains minorities, chil-
dren, senior citizens, and the poor in basic internet skills.247 These initia-
tives serve and educate the community, thereby constituting a form of
community reinvestment. Moreover, these initiatives may begin to re-
solve the problem of the digital divide. Educating those without internet
skills encourages more participation in online banking.248 Educational
and access programs constitute reinvestment and should be an alternate
way to gain CRA credit.249
A strategic plan is another problem-solving proposition regarding the
cyberbank dilemma.25 ° The concept requires bank and community repre-
sentatives to formulate a CRA plan together.25' The institution then no-
tifies the public of its plan, as well as submits it for approval to the
corresponding overseeing agency.252 By working conjointly, a methodol-
ogy is formulated to define how the institution will reinvest in the com-
munity. Strategic plans will reduce the pressure of community groups on
institutions, as the groups would take a part in the drafting process. This
clearly constitutes another method for maintaining CRA success.
V. CONCLUSION
The Community Reinvestment Act is a positive piece of legislation.
Without the CRA, discrimination against minorities in the mortgage
lending process will persist.253 The CRA's goals of redressing discrimina-
tion, specifically redlining practices and disinvestment of communities,
will be realized by holding financial institutions accountable.254 To main-
tain the core principles of the CRA in the future, the outdated legislation
must be modernized. The GLBA and the rise of internet banking sub-
stantially threaten CRA principles. Without modernization, the notions
of community lending and equal access to credit will eventually become
obsolete.
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